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Abstract 
This paper forms part of the proceedings for the 6
th
 Annual Berle Symposium (2014), which 
focused on Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s 1999 Virginia Law Review article “A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law” (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=425500).  Blair 
and Stout suggested a few years after the publication of their 1999 article that their team 
production model was poised to emerge as part of a new corporate law “paradigm” in the 
sense that Thomas Kuhn deployed the term in his widely cited The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.  This paper revisits Blair and Stout’s team production theory by offering a 
critique of this claim and in so doing draws upon key corporate law theories and trends to 
offer insights concerning their model.        
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout introduced the team production theory of corporate 
law in a landmark 1999 article in the Virginia Law Review.
1
  Their team production model, as 
is well-known, characterized the board of directors as a mediating hierarchy that balances the 
interests of a corporation’s various constituencies and does so in a way that successfully 
addresses in the context of the publicly traded corporation the challenges associated with 
fostering productive activity requiring combined investment and coordinated effort.
2
  
According to Blair and Stout, their team production theory was an analytical step forward as 
compared to the influential contractarian model of the corporation oriented around “agency 
costs” with managers as agents and shareholders as principals.3  Additionally, they said their 
model explicitly challenged a dominant shareholder primacy “norm”.4  Blair and Stout 
suggested subsequently in a 2006 article that the team production model not only could 
explain a wide range of important phenomena in the business world but potentially provided 
the basis for a new corporate law paradigm, a claim Stout reiterated in her 2012 book The 
Shareholder Value Myth.
5
   
Blair and Stout’s team production model has attracted widespread interest and clearly 
is an appropriate departure point for a conference such as the 6
th
 Annual Berle Symposium.  
Justice John Paul Stevens cited their 1999 article in his widely read dissenting opinion in 
                                                          
1
  Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).    
2
  Ibid., 253, 271-72, 275-86, 298-305; Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, Director 
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 403, 419-
22 (2001).     
3
  Blair and Stout, supra note 1, 248-50, 254-55. 
4
  Ibid., 249, 253. 
5
  Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment:  Explaining Anomalies in 
Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 723, 733-37 (2006); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH:  HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND 
THE PUBLIC 58, 85 (2012).  See further infra notes 19 to 21 and related discussion.  
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Citizens United v Federal Election Commission.
6
  Moreover, as of 2012, no other legal article 
published in 1999 has been cited more often.
7
  Nevertheless, while Blair and Stout’s work on 
team production constitutes a logical and indeed admirable choice as the topic for the 6
th
 
Berle Symposium, their invocation of “paradigm” rhetoric to characterize the team 
production model’s place in the corporate law theory firmament is problematic.   
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a paradigm can be defined as “a 
generally accepted world view.”8  Blair and Stout have not employed “paradigm” in this 
generic sense when seeking to situate the team production model.  Instead, they have 
specifically referenced Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.9  In this 
widely cited book Kuhn deployed the term “paradigm” in order to characterize scientific 
endeavour in a manner different from the orthodox view that there is accumulation of 
knowledge by reliance on “scientific method”.10   
Blair and Stout’s 2006 invocation of Kuhn’s analytical framework was not entirely a 
novel one.  Instead, other corporate law scholars, including myself, had previously drawn 
                                                          
6
  Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 130 US 876, 978 (2010); 
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/research-by-margaret-blair-cited-in-citizens-united-dissent/ 
(accessed April 24, 2014). 
7
  Fred R. Shapiro and Michelle Pearse, The Most Cited Law Review Articles of All 
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2012).  The search methodology extended beyond law 
reviews to encompass other academic journals – ibid., 1486-87.  
8
  http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/137329?redirectedFrom=paradigm#eid (accessed 
April 24, 2014).   
9
  Blair and Stout, supra note 5, 721-22; STOUT, supra note 5, 58; Lynn A. Stout, On the 
Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the 
Closet), 36 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1169, 1181, n. 65, discussing THOMAS KUHN, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3
rd
 ed., 1996). 
10
  See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE TRAJECTORY OF (CORPORATE LAW) SCHOLARSHIP:  AN 
INAUGURAL LECTURE GIVEN IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, OCTOBER 2003 12-13 
(2004).    
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upon Kuhn to describe trends in corporate law theory.
11
  I argued when I discussed Kuhn in a 
2004 publication that it was unclear whether his characterization of scientific endeavour 
could be used appropriately to analyze corporate law theory trends.
12
  I will make that point 
briefly again here.  For present purposes, however, it will generally be assumed that Kuhn’s 
work on scientific endeavour can be drawn upon to characterize the development of corporate 
law theory.  From this departure point, this paper analyzes Blair and Stout’s team production 
theory by reference to the Kuhnian framework they have invoked and in so doing argues that 
characterizing the team production model as part of a new corporate law paradigm is 
problematic in two basic respects.   
First, it is open to question whether the team production model constitutes a 
sufficiently radical departure from other theories to qualify as a new paradigm.  In Kuhnian 
terms a new paradigm emerges after an intellectual crisis sets the stage for a “paradigm shift”.  
It follows that the team production model, as the core element of a new paradigm, should 
have constituted a fundamental departure from received wisdom.  It is far from clear that their 
theory qualifies.  The idea that boards of publicly traded companies constitute mediating 
hierarchs harkens back to a “managerialist” conception of the corporation that was during the 
mid-20
th
 century associated with a highly influential separation of ownership and control 
theory of publicly traded companies.  Moreover, Blair and Stout did not reject outright in 
their 1999 article what was at the time the dominant intellectual construct in corporate law, 
the nexus of contracts model of the corporation.  Instead, Blair and Stout said their intention 
                                                          
11
  Ibid., 51-53, 62-66; Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law:  
A Critical Assessment, 43 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1633 (2002).  
12
  CHEFFINS, supra note 10, 65-66.    
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was to use contractarian analysis as an intellectual departure point to develop a more fully 
rounded conception of corporate law.
13
   
Second, even if the team production model can be distinguished sufficiently from 
prior corporate law theories to qualify as a new paradigm it is by no means assured that it will 
prevail in the battle of ideas in the manner required.  Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman 
made this point in a 2006 article that appeared in the same symposium issue as the article in 
which Blair and Stout invoked Kuhn to situate the team production model.
14
  Gilson and 
Kraakman, in addition to suggesting that it should fall to observers other than those who have 
developed a theoretical model to assess the model’s significance, indicated that Blair and 
Stout’s claim the team production model amounted to a new paradigm in corporate law 
scholarship was premature.
15
  This point is as salient as when Gilson and Kraakman made it, 
if not more so.   
The most robust challenge Blair and Stout made to conventional wisdom in their 1999 
article concerned shareholder primacy.  According to team production theory directors should 
not privilege shareholders in the manner the shareholder primacy norm implies but instead 
should be disinterested trustees who faithfully represent the interests of all team members.
16
  
Given that shareholder primacy is antithetical to the idea that boards of public companies 
should conduct themselves as mediating hierarchs balancing the interests of corporate 
constituencies, the team production model seemingly can only move to the forefront if 
shareholder primacy is being eclipsed.  This does not appear to be happening.  Instead, there 
                                                          
13
  See infra notes 78, 81-82 and related discussion; CHEFFINS, supra note 10, 50-53.    
14
  Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law:  Filling 
Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 597 (2006). 
15
  Ibid., 603, n. 19. 
16
  Blair and Stout, supra note 1, 286.   
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has been over the past few years a surge in shareholder influence in publicly traded 
corporations prompted primarily by activism campaigns hedge funds have launched.   
The Financial Times suggested in 2013 that “Corporate America and activist 
investors have had a war; the activists have won.”17  It logically follows, as a Wall Street 
Journal columnist observed in 2014, that activist investor priorities have “hardened into the 
default boardroom agenda.”18  Directors thinking in this way are ill-suited to function as 
mediating hierarchs arbitrating in an unbiased way between key corporate constituencies.  
Correspondingly, the “inconvenient truth” of hedge fund activism refutes, at least for the time 
being, Blair and Stout’s prediction of the team production model’s emergence as a corporate 
law theory paradigm (or least sub-paradigm).   
II. IDENTIFYING CORPORATE LAW PARADIGMS 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, citing the work of Thomas Kuhn, suggested in a 2006 
Journal of Corporation Law article that their team production model was part of “a new 
paradigm appearing in corporate law scholarship.”19  Stout, again citing Kuhn, made a similar 
claim in her 2012 book The Shareholder Value Myth.
20
  According to Stout, team production 
theory showed that businesses could not thrive if they were run according to shareholder 
primacy ideology, a “‘dominant paradigm of corporate purpose’” apt to be replaced by a new, 
alternative theory due to the prevalence of supposed anomalies inconsistent with shareholder 
primacy’s essential precepts.21   
                                                          
17
  Carl Icahn, Web Mogul, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 2013, 24.  
18
  Denis K. Berman, For Activists There are No More Worlds to Conquer, WALL ST. J., 
April 23, 2014, B1.  
19
  Blair and Stout, supra note 5, 723, 733-37.    
20
  STOUT, supra note 5. 
21
  Ibid., 58, 85.   
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In order to assess whether team production theory is a candidate for paradigmatic 
status in the sense Kuhn intended the essential elements of the Kuhnian framework require 
explication and predecessor corporate law paradigms need to be identified.  In an inaugural 
lecture published in the form of a 2004 monograph I analyzed various potential trajectories 
for the evolution of knowledge in intellectual disciplines and used corporate law scholarship 
as a case study.
22
  Kuhn’s characterization of the development of scientific endeavour was 
one of the trajectories of which I took into account and, applying his intellectual framework 
to corporate law theory, identified potential corporate law paradigms.
23
  I draw liberally here 
on what I said then to summarize Kuhn’s thinking and identify the corporate law theory 
paradigms relevant to team production theory.   
According to Kuhn, once sufficiently convincing work is carried out in a given field 
to generate agreement concerning key theoretical precepts, research proceeds beyond an 
“immature” or “pre-paradigm” phase.24  With a tight research consensus in place, those 
working in the field are then spared the distracting re-examination of first principles and 
instead use the dominant “paradigm” as the departure point to solve “puzzles” posed yielding 
incremental improvements in analysis.  Kuhn, focusing as he was on the development of 
scientific endeavour, referred to such research as “normal science”, constituting “mop-up” 
work within a “mature” field.   
Kuhn noted that those working in accordance within the precepts of “normal science” 
can encounter periodically inexplicable anomalies.  The anomalies often prompt small 
adjustments within normal science as confirmation or disconfirmation of various theories 
                                                          
22
  CHEFFINS, supra note 10.  A slightly modified version was published in the 
Cambridge Law Journal:  Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 
63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456 (2004).  A working paper version is available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=429624. 
23
  CHEFFINS, supra note 10, 13-14, 62-65.     
24
  Kuhn’s seminal work on point is KUHN, supra note 9.   
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falling with the governing paradigm proceeds.
25
  Another possibility, however, is that 
unexplained anomalies will accumulate sufficiently to destabilize the existing consensus.  A 
“scientific revolution” will then occur that can then yield a new paradigm oriented around an 
entirely new theoretical framework.  After this sort of “paradigm shift”, normal science 
recommences and the stage is set for the cycle to repeat itself.    
Assuming for the sake of argument that Kuhn’s paradigm terminology can be applied 
to corporate law theory a separation of ownership and control thesis qualifies as the initial 
paradigm, at least with respect to U.S. public companies.
26
   An inconclusive debate during 
the opening decades of the 20
th
 century on the nature of corporate personality can be 
categorized as corporate law theory’s “immature” phase.   Matters changed with the 1932 
publication of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property,
27
 which is widely credited with showing that a separation of ownership 
(shareholders) and control (top management) was prevalent in large public companies.
28
  A 
consensus subsequently emerged among corporate law academics – at least in the United 
States -- that for publicly traded companies Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and 
control thesis was the appropriate intellectual departure point for analyzing corporate law.   
                                                          
25
  Robert Cooter, Maturing into Normal Science:  The Effect of Empirical Legal Studies 
on Law and Economics [2011] U. ILL. L. REV. 1475, 1476.  
26
  CHEFFINS, supra note 10, 38-40, 62-63. 
27
  ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932).   
28
  Though Berle and Means were hailed for making the separation of ownership and 
control point empirically, the evidence they offered in fact was equivocal.  See Brian 
Cheffins and Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 443, 
453-54 (2009).     
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In the classic “Berle-Means corporation”29 widely dispersed shareholders lacking 
sufficient financial incentives to intervene would remain passive as professionally trained 
executives managed the firm.  A corporation of this sort could benefit from high-quality 
management because executives could be hired purely on the basis of their managerial 
capabilities.
30
  There was a danger, however, that due to insufficient accountability to 
shareholders or others those running large corporations would become “irresponsible 
oligarchs.”31  For decades following the 1932 publication of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property this possibility provided the departure point for the bulk of theoretically-
oriented corporate law scholarship in the United States.  As Roberta Romano observed in a 
1984 article on corporate law theory and law reform, Berle and Means’ separation of 
ownership and control thesis became “the master problem for research.”32  To the extent that 
the thesis constituted the initial corporate law theory paradigm, the scholarship that addressed 
the legal and policy implications can be thought of as “normal science”.33   
Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and control thesis came to prominence in 
tandem with a philosophy of “managerialism” that was a core feature of an era of 
“managerial capitalism”.34  During the late 19th century and the opening decades of the 20th 
century, the United States experienced what distinguished business historian Alfred Chandler 
would characterize as a “managerial revolution” where a growing division between 
                                                          
29
  The term was coined by Mark Roe:  Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American 
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11 (1991).    
30
  Brian R. Cheffins, Introduction, THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE i, xi (Brian R. Cheffins, ed. 2011). 
31
  Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AMER. ECON. 
REV. 311, 316 (1957).   
32
  Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 
923 (1984).    
33
  CHEFFINS, supra note 10, 63. 
34
  For a succinct overview of the chronology and terminology, see GERALD F. DAVIS, 
MANAGED BY THE MARKETS:  HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA 32-33, 62-63 (2009). 
9 
 
ownership and control was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated managerial hierarchies 
and the development of an increasingly professional ethos among corporate executives.
35
  
According to Chandler, who identified Berle and Means as the first to point out the separation 
of ownership and control,
36
 by the 1950s and 1960s “managerial capitalism had triumphed” 
with the managerial enterprise being dominant in pivotal sectors of the U.S. economy.
37
 
While a separation of ownership and control creates risks of managerial abuse of 
power, in the decades immediately following World War II only rarely did executives fail to 
fulfil the responsibilities associated with the stewardship of corporate assets.
38
  This can 
plausibly be attributed – as indeed Lynn Stout has done – to the mind set of executives during 
the managerial capitalism era.  She has suggested directors and executives of managerialist 
public companies were faithful corporate servants because they “viewed themselves as 
stewards or trustees charged with guiding a vital and economic and social institution.” 39   
According to Stout a beneficial by-product of post-World War II managerial attitudes 
was that “managerial capitalism worked surprisingly well for dispersed and powerless 
                                                          
35
  ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 9, 484 (1977). 
36
  Alfred D. Chandler, The Competitive Performance of U.S. Industrial Enterprises 
since the Second World War, 68 BUS. HIST. REV. 1, 14 (1994).  In fact, others had remarked 
upon the phenomenon previously but did not offer the extensive documentation Berle and 
Means provided:  Cheffins and Bank, supra note 28, 452-53.    
37
  Alfred D. Chandler, The United States:  Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism in 
MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF THE MODERN 
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (Alfred D. Chandler and Herman Daems eds., 1980), 35. 
38
  Cheffins, supra note 30, xi-xii; Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism:  Investor 
Capitalism?, 22 J.L. REF. 117, 123 (1988) (“During the first half of the twentieth century, the 
self-serving antics of managers seemed relatively innocuous”); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE 
BOARDROOM 106 (2005) (saying that while US business culture is susceptible to 
counterproductively risky “Icaran” tendencies during the decades following the Depression 
“It became much harder for an Icaran entrepreneur to disguise what he was doing.  For a 
time, at least, Icarus had been tamed.”)  
39
  Stout, supra note 9, 1171.   
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shareholders.”40  Management, however, did not focus myopically on stockholders.  
According to Stout, boards and executives who embraced the managerialist philosophy did 
not see themselves “as mere agents of shareholders.”41  Instead, they viewed themselves as 
stewards running their companies “in the interests of a wide range of beneficiaries.  Certainly 
they looked out for investors’ interests, but they looked out for the interests of employees, 
customers, and the nation as well.”42  
Stout, in offering her favorable verdict on managerial capitalism, concurred in large 
measure with Adolf Berle.  While Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and control 
thesis implied a potentially detrimental lack of managerial accountability, in the foreword to a 
1959 book, The Corporation in Modern Society, Berle said “The principles and practice of 
big business in 1959 seem to be considerably more responsible, more perceptive and (in plain 
English) more honest than they were in 1929.”43  In a 1962 law review article he similarly 
noted that serious corporate scandals were “happily, rare” and acknowledged that conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders had not become more pronounced despite an 
acceleration of the separation of ownership and control in the three decades following the 
publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
44
   
There was in addition agreement between Berle and Stout on the goals and aspirations 
of executives during the era of managerial capitalism.  Coincident with the publication of The 
                                                          
40
  Ibid.   
41
  Ibid.   
42
  Ibid. (footnote omitted).   
43
  Adolf A. Berle, Foreword, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY ix, xiii (Edward 
S. Mason, ed., 1959). 
44
  Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV.  433, 
437, 438, n. 9 (1962).  One should not assume, however, that unsavory behavior was entirely 
absent in US public corporations in the mid-20
th
 century.  For examples, see Donald C. 
Hambrick, Just How Bad Are Our Theories?  A Response to Ghoshal, 4 ACAD. MGMT. 
LEARNING & EDUC. 104, 106 (2005).  
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Modern Corporation and Private Property Berle engaged in a well-known debate with E. 
Merrick Dodd with, in Berle’s words, “the writer holding that corporate powers were held in 
trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for 
the entire community.”45  Berle conceded in 1954 that “(t)he argument ha(d) been settled (at 
least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”46  Berle 
elaborated, saying that corporations, as “trustees for the community,” must “provide a given 
set of goods and services for the community and in so doing so must provide employment for 
a great number of people” and should “assure the continued stability, health, and 
serviceability of their industries.”47  He added in his foreword to The Corporation in Modern 
Society “modern directors are not limited to running business enterprise for maximum profit, 
but are in fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community system.”48  How did 
shareholders fare under this system?  Berle said, consistent with Stout’s verdict on 
managerial capitalism, that shareholders usually did “well, even though stockholders do not 
hold the center of the corporate stage….”49   
Berle’s managerialist views were mainstream for the time.  A 1961 Harvard Business 
Review survey of 1700 senior managers found 83% agreed it was unethical for “executives to 
act in the interests of shareholders alone, and not also in the interests of employees and 
                                                          
45
  ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20
TH
 CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).  On the 
1930s debate between Berle and Dodd see C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate 
Social Responsibility:  An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 KANSAS 
L. REV. 77, 87-99, 101-4 (2002); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism:  Berle and 
Means and 20
th
-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOCIAL INQ. 179, 205-9 (2005); 
William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:  
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 122-35 (2008).    
46
  BERLE, supra  note 45, 169. 
47
  Ibid., 170.    
48
  Berle, supra note 43, xii.  
49
  BERLE, supra note 45, 170. 
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consumers….”50  More generally, according to Harwell Wells, during the 1950s and 1960s 
the idea that executives “were responsible no longer for shareholders alone, but for other 
constituencies and, indeed, society at large…” was accepted by a “wide swathe of 
individuals, from leftist social critics, to moderate theorists of the corporation, to senior 
executives themselves….”51   
Again, according to Kuhn’s scientific methodology typology, “paradigm shifts” are 
preceded by the emergence of doubts concerning the existing paradigm followed by a 
“scientific revolution” yielding a new paradigm.52  With respect to corporate law theory, 
robust questioning of the separation of the ownership and control paradigm was evident by 
the early 1970s.  As Henry Manne said in 1973:  
“We have begun to note a whole series of questions related to the nature of the firm, 
particularly large, publicly-held corporations.  Here the issue of discontinuities in the 
interests of shareholders and managers, popularly raised by Berle and Means in 1933, 
shows more vitality than seemed likely only a few years ago.”53 
Continuing with the Kuhnian analogy, the accumulation of anomalies was followed 
during the late 1970s and the 1980s with a scientific revolution in the area of corporate law 
theory that culminated with a paradigm shift in favor of the nexus-of-contracts model of the 
                                                          
50
  Raymond C. Baumhart, How Ethical are Businessmen?, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 
1961, 6, 10, quoted in Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950-2005:  Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 
1512 (2007).    
51
  Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”:  Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, 
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PENN. J. 
BUS. L. 305 326, 331 (2013).  
52
  Supra note 24 and related discussion. 
53
  Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism:  An Individualistic 
Model, 59 VA. L. REV. 708, 708-9 (1973).    
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corporation.
54
  Strongly influenced by economists who departed from economic orthodoxy 
and treated the firm as a nexus of contracting relationships rather than a “black box”, 
“contractarian”55 corporate law academics prompted “a revolution in corporate law 
scholarship.”56  The revolution, according to a 2013 book on corporate law theory by Marc 
Moore, resulted in an “objectively indisputable fact:  that the contractarian paradigm is 
unquestionably the dominant ideological reference point with the field of Anglo-American 
corporate law and governance today.”57   
To the extent that the nexus of contracts model was a new paradigm, the paradigm 
shift was complete by the early 1990s.
58
  As William Bratton said in 1992 of contractarian 
scholars exemplified by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, “the campaign has ended with 
victory achieved.”59  Blair and Stout acknowledged the prevalence of contractarian thinking 
in their 1999 team production article, saying it had “become common for both economic and 
legal theorists to view a corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’….”60  They observed similarly 
                                                          
54
  MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 62, 67 
(2013). 
55
  Jack Coffee has been credited for first using the term “contractarian” to describe those 
engaging in nexus of contracts analysis:  Brian Dean Abramson, Why the Limited Liability 
Company Should Sound the Death Knell of the Application of the Application of the “Nexus 
of Contracts” Theory of the Corporation, 1 FLA. INT. UNIV. L. REV. 185, 187, n. 8 (2006), 
citing John C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:  An Essay on the 
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989).   
56
  Jason Scott Johnson, The Influence of “The Nature of the Firm” on the Theory of 
Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 231 (1993); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of 
Contracts Approach to Corporations:  A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989) (“Critics and advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner 
‘nexus of contracts’ has in the last decade swept through the legal theory of the corporation.”)  
For additional background see CHEFFINS, supra note 10, 44-47.   
57
  MOORE, supra note 54, 71-72.    
58
  CHEFFINS, supra note 10, 49. 
59
  William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 
87 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 180, 190 (1992).      
60
  Blair and Stout, supra note 1, 319.   
14 
 
in a 2001 article that “Contractarian thinking…preoccupies modern corporate law 
scholarship.”61   
Agency cost or principal/agent theory, which presupposes that in economic terms an 
agency relationship arises when one person (“the agent”) has been engaged by another (“the 
principal”) to perform a service with some decision-making authority being delegated to the 
agent,
62
 was a pivotal feature of the newly dominant contractarian analysis.
63
  Blair and Stout 
argued in their 1999 article that the growing prominence of agency cost theory had a 
significant knock-on effect, namely helping to foster the dominance of a “shareholder 
primacy norm.”64  They said the principal/agent model 
“has given rise to two recurring themes in the literature:  First, the central economic 
problem addressed by corporation law is reducing ‘agency costs’ by keeping directors 
and managers faithful to shareholders’ interests; and second, that the primary goal of 
the public corporation is – or ought to be – maximizing shareholders’ wealth.”65 
In the corporate law realm academics did deploy agency theory primarily to examine 
the relationship between shareholders of publicly traded corporations on one hand and senior 
                                                          
61
  Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.  1735, 1737, n. 2 (2001).  David Millon, 
in an article critiquing team production theory, offered a similar verdict on this point, noting 
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management on the other.
66
  Nevertheless, neither principal/agent theory nor contractarian 
analysis was inextricably linked to shareholder primacy.  For instance, agency cost theory is 
potentially applicable to a wide range of economic contexts, not just manager/shareholder 
interaction in public companies.
67
  As Blair and Stout pointed out themselves in their 1999 
article, “the public corporation is hardly unique in its use of agents.”68   
With respect to contractarian analysis and the shareholder primacy norm, as noted 
corporate law academic Melvin Eisenberg has said, “It is commonly thought that the nexus-
of-contracts conception is connected in some fundamental way to the concept of shareholder 
primacy.  It isn’t.”69  Instead, with shareholders being merely one constituency that is part of 
the nexus of contracts it is not obvious a priori why managers should assign shareholders 
special priority.
70
  Indeed, Jonathan Macey, another distinguished corporate law academic, 
has said “(t)he nexus-of-contracts approach to the corporation appears to be strongly at odds” 
with the proposition that corporations and directors should maximize value for shareholders, 
and shareholders alone.
71
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67
  For instance, Easterbrook and Fischel, the prominent contractarian corporate law 
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10 (1991). 
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While neither agency theory nor the nexus of contracts model necessarily compel the 
invocation of shareholder primacy, contractarian scholars did as a practical matter tend to 
ascribe pre-eminence to shareholders in the manner shareholder primacy implies.  Advocates 
of the nexus of contracts model would, for instance, draw attention to shareholders’ status as 
“residual claimants,”72 in the sense that the return shares deliver is based on what is left over 
after satisfaction of claims by employees, creditors and others entitled to “fixed” returns.73  
Under such circumstances, the argument went, shareholder value will tend to coincide with 
corporate success because every step a corporation takes can affect shareholder wealth 
whereas fixed claimants will be indifferent to corporate policymaking unless the likelihood of 
default or termination of contractual relations increases materially.
74
  Contractarians also 
cited contracting costs to justify shareholder primacy.
75
  They suggested the pre-eminent 
position of shareholders in the corporate nexus of contracts reflected the fact that creditors, 
employees and customers, due to the fixed nature of their claims, could bargain more readily 
for suitable protection than shareholders making the open-ended investment associated with 
corporate equity.
76
  
III. SITUATING THE TEAM PRODUCTION MODEL  
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Assuming that developments in corporate law theory can be described by reference to 
Kuhn’s typology of scientific endeavour, in order for the team production model to constitute 
the core element of a new corporate law paradigm the theory should constitute a marked 
intellectual departure from the past.  Otherwise, the model would likely amount merely to 
“mop up” work or “normal science” within the confines of the existing paradigm.  Moreover, 
it will be problematic if team production theory harkens back to a dominant mode of analysis 
preceding the paradigm it ostensibly is replacing because this will imply that the trajectory of 
corporate law scholarship is not a Kuhnian journey but instead is primarily cyclical.   
On both counts, the team production model’s status as a new corporate law paradigm 
is problematic.  When one refers back to Blair and Stout’s 1999 article, their characterization 
of team production theory is more closely akin to contractarian “normal science” than it is to 
a new paradigm.  Moreover, to the extent that the team production model can be 
distinguished from the nexus of contracts “paradigm” or its principal/agent and shareholder 
primacy “sub-paradigms”,77 the theory arguably harkens back to what can be thought of as an 
earlier (sub-)paradigm – managerialism – as much as it provides the platform for fresh 
thinking.   
A. “Normal Science”  
In Kuhnian terms academic endeavour that constitutes “mop-up” work within a 
“mature” field will not constitute a new paradigm because this sort of “normal science” 
occurs within the intellectual confines of the existing paradigm.  Only when the prevailing 
consensus has been disrupted by an accumulation of anomalies can a “paradigm shift” occur.  
                                                          
77
  Kuhn never referred to a “sub-paradigm” but others relying on Kuhn’s analytical 
framework have done so.  See, for example, Neil Warren, Is a Scientific Revolution Taking 
Place in Psychology:  Doubts and Reservations, 1 SCIENCE STUD. 407, 409 (1971); Tom 
Mouck, The “Revolution” in Financial Reporting Theory:  A Kuhnian Interpretation, 20 
ACCTING. HIST. J. 33, 38, 41 (1993).   
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Hence, the emergence of team production theory as a new paradigm presupposes the 
discrediting of prior dominant models.  Blair and Stout, in their 1999 article on the team 
production model, did not characterize the relevant literature in this way.  Instead, they 
emphasized continuity with contractarian analysis and treated the nexus of contracts model as 
a key departure point rather than as an outdated and discredited intellectual construct.
78
  In 
Kuhnian terms, it seems Blair and Stout were engaging in normal science with the nexus of 
contracts approach as the dominant paradigm.   
Blair and Stout did not adopt the nexus of contracts model wholesale in their 1999 
article.  They argued that the public corporation was “not so much a ‘nexus of contracts’ 
(explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments’ in which several different 
groups…find it difficult to protect their contribution through explicit contracts.”79  Moreover, 
in a 1999 response to an article commenting on team production theory Blair and Stout 
pointed out that “the team production approach highlights the necessity of finding non-
contractual means of inducing corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, to trust each 
other enough to invest in team production.”80  Nevertheless they said in their original 1999 
article that their approach to public corporations “does not reject…contractarian thinking, but 
builds upon it by acknowledging the limits of what can be achieved by explicit 
contracting.”81  Moreover, they indicated team production theory was “consistent with the 
‘nexus of contracts’ approach to understanding corporate law” and explicitly “locate(d) the 
                                                          
78
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mediating hierarchy model of the public corporation within the nexus of contracts tradition”82  
In Kuhnian terms, then, Blair and Stout were seeking primarily to execute an adjustment in 
relation to the dominant contractarian paradigm rather than identify anomalies calling the 
paradigm into question.   
While Blair and Stout emphasized in their 1999 article continuity between team 
production theory and nexus of contracts thinking the situation was different with the 
principal-agent model and shareholder value norm often associated with contractarian 
analysis.  As they said, “we take issue with both”.83  With agency theory, however, Blair and 
Stout did not seek to turn the received wisdom entirely on its head.  Instead, they 
acknowledged “principal-agent analysis has been very useful in analysing certain kinds of 
contractual relationships.”84  What they sought to question was what they referred to as the 
“grand-design principal-agent model”, which assumed that there was in every firm a principal 
– the shareholders in the case of a corporation – who was understood to be the owner as well 
as the residual claimant.
85
  Blair and Stout said that because “a public corporation is a team of 
people who enter into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain” what they 
referred to as “the peak of the pyramid” should be “occupied not by some owner/principal, 
but (the) board of directors.”86  Hence, Blair and Stout did not reject principal-agent analysis 
outright in the manner one would expect with a paradigm shift but rather sought to recast it in 
the context of the public corporation.  Arguably this was more “normal science.”  
                                                          
82
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Shareholder primacy was a different story.  There would be no mop up work in 
relation to this (sub-)paradigm.  Having identified the board of the public corporation as the 
“peak of the pyramid”, Blair and Stout said 
“the primary job of the board of directors is not to act as agents who ruthlessly pursue 
shareholders’ interests at the expense of employees, creditors, or other team members.  
Rather, the directors are trustees for the corporation itself – mediating hierarchs 
whose job is to balance members’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps 
everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays together.”87    
Unlike with the nexus of contracts model and principal-agent theory, Blair and Stout made no 
effort in their 1999 article to reconcile the team production model with shareholder primacy.  
Instead, their “claim (was) that directors should be viewed as disinterested trustees charged 
with faithfully representing the interests not just of shareholders, but of all team members.”88  
Hence, as they said, their “view challenge(d) the shareholder primacy norm that has come to 
dominate the theoretical literature.”89    
Even if Blair and Stout’s 1999 article challenged the shareholder primacy norm 
directly in a way that did not occur with the nexus of contracts model or principal-agent 
theory, applying the Kuhnian analogy again, Blair and Stout’s initial presentation of the team 
production model could not at that point in time constitute a new paradigm.  Kuhn’s scientific 
revolutions pre-suppose the identification of anomalies and intellectual ferment as a precursor 
to a paradigm shift.
90
  With respect to corporate law theory, shareholder primacy was not 
facing that sort of challenge at the time Blair and Stout presented their team production 
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model.  They acknowledged in their 1999 article that “most contemporary corporate scholars 
tend to assume that directors’ proper role is to maximize the economic interests of the 
corporation’s shareholders.”91  Or as Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman said in their 
2001 article The End of History of Corporate Law, “there is today a broad normative 
consensus that shareholders alone are the parties to whom corporate managers should be 
accountable….”92   
In the intellectual milieu prevailing at the time Blair and Stout published their 1999 
article, in Kuhnian terms the most the article could realistically achieve was to draw attention 
to anomalies that would help to foster the debate that could ultimately result in a consensus 
around a new paradigm.  The manner in which they concluded the article illustrates the point.  
Having said “excessive and misleading” emphasis had been “placed on principal-agent 
problems in the corporate literature” they indicated “future debates about corporate 
governance will be more fruitful if they start from a better model” and they characterized the 
mediating hierarchy model as “a first step toward that better view.”93  Hence, in Kuhnian 
terms Blair and Stout were implicitly conceding that while presentation of the team 
production model might help to launch the intellectual journey that would yield a new 
paradigm it was not as such the new paradigm.   
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The fact that in chronological terms Blair and Stout’s 1999 article would not have 
itself heralded the launch of a new corporate law paradigm does not preclude team production 
theory from subsequently being a foundational element of such a (sub-)paradigm.  As we will 
see in Part IV.A of the paper, shareholder primacy has faced a strong intellectual challenge 
since Hansmann and Kraakman proclaimed in 2001 “(t)he triumph of the shareholder-
oriented model of the corporation.”94  This intellectual ferment theoretically could have 
opened the way for a new paradigm oriented around the team production model.  Before we 
canvass that possibility we will consider whether, whatever the current status of shareholder 
primacy, the team production model is more of an intellectual throwback rather than a 
forerunner.   
B. Managerialism Redux?   
It has been assumed to this point, consistent with Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s 
invocation of Thomas Kuhn and his paradigm terminology, that Kuhn’s work is relevant to 
corporate law scholarship.  The appropriateness of this move cannot be taken for granted 
even though legal scholars have frequently borrowed from Kuhn to describe trends in the 
academic literature.
95
.  The fact Kuhn was focusing on the development of scientific thought 
rather than intellectual endeavour generally is an obvious source of concern on this front.   
Scientific inquiry involves explicit theory-building, data collection, hypothesis 
testing, replication and corroboration.
96
  Robert Cooter has argued that the recent flourishing 
of empirical legal scholarship has meant that the law and economics movement that began to 
transform academic writing about law in the 1970s and 1980s has matured into Kuhn’s 
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“normal science”.97  Empirical research and economic analysis more generally may have 
added a fresh “scientific” dimension to corporate law research.98  Still, explicit deployment of 
scientific methodology remains the exception to the rule in corporate law scholarship, which 
continues to be primarily oriented around doctrinal and policy-related research.
99
  Many legal 
academics even doubt whether deployment of scientific method is appropriate for the study 
of law.
100
  Correspondingly, drawing upon an analytical framework designed to account for 
the development of science to characterize corporate law scholarship trends is a problematic 
move.
101
   
Even if parallels between scientific endeavour and corporate law scholarship are 
sufficient to mean that Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions is potentially salient, it remains 
open to question whether changing trends in corporate law theory can be characterized as 
paradigm shifts.  Kuhn’s paradigm shifts cannot occur without paradigms and according to 
Kuhn a paradigm presupposes a tight research consensus which provides the platform for the 
“mop up” work associated with normal science.102  It is open to question, however, whether 
this has ever been achieved with corporate law theory.  For instance, Berle and Means’ 
separation of ownership and control analysis and the nexus of contracts model were much 
more influential and widely accepted in the United States than they ever were elsewhere.
103
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Hence, with corporate law scholarship it is only possible to speak of paradigms if the United 
States can be treated in isolation as the appropriate reference point. 
Even setting the foreign angle to one side, it is unclear whether the research consensus 
required for there to be a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense has ever been present in the 
corporate law area.  For instance, despite Moore’s 2013 declaration of a corporate law 
“contractarian paradigm” and a 2001 acknowledgment by Blair and Stout that the nexus of 
contacts model “preoccupie(d) modern corporate law scholarship”104 a substantial number of 
American corporate law academics were never converted.
105
  The situation has been similar 
with the shareholder primacy (sub-)paradigm.  While Hansmann and Kraakman indicated that 
there was a “broad normative consensus” concerning the pre-eminence of shareholders, even 
when they made this claim adherence to shareholder primacy was not uniform among 
corporate law scholars.  Robert Clark observed, for instance, in a response to papers 
published in a symposium marking the 20
th
 anniversary of his 1986 treatise on corporate law, 
“a major trend in legal scholarship since the publication of my treatise has been the 
elaboration and defense of differing viewpoints about the purposes of corporations and the 
proper allocation of powers and duties among their constituents.”106   
If with respect to corporate law there have not been Kuhnian paradigms – thus 
precluding possible paradigm shifts to the team production theory – how might the model’s 
intellectual contribution be characterized?  Paradigm shifts constitute only one of a series of 
potential trajectories for corporate law scholarship.  One possibility which is salient in this 
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particular context is a cyclical dimension, in the sense that academic endeavour constitutes at 
least to some degree a continuing conversation about core questions.
107
   
To the extent corporate law theory addresses a series of key recurring questions, one 
which qualifies is “On whose behalf are companies run?”108  The answer the team production 
model provides harkens back to managerialist thinking associated with Berle and Means’ 
separation of ownership and control thesis.  As mentioned, Blair and Stout saw the team 
production model as a challenger to shareholder primacy, with boards acting as trustees 
working to promote the interests of all team members rather than ultimately looking out only 
for shareholders.
109
  This echoes the managerialist thinking of Adolf Berle, who again 
characterized large corporations as “trustees for the community” with directors not being 
under an onus to run their companies “for maximum profit.”110 
Identifying parallels between team production theory and the managerialist 
conception of the corporation is by no means novel.  Harwell Wells, in a 2013 article on the 
historical relationship between managerialism and corporate law, flagged up the possibility 
that Blair and Stout, with their team production theory, “repackage managerialism.”111  
George Dent has likewise referred to the team production model as “(a) modern variation on 
managerialism.”112  
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Stout has, writing independently from Blair, recently evinced considerable enthusiasm 
for managerialism.  Indeed, consistent with the proposition that influential schools of thought 
can have a cyclical dimension, she has suggested a managerialist comeback could be on the 
cards.  She has conceded managerial capitalism was “hardly perfect” but nevertheless 
maintains it generated “good results”.113  Shareholder primacy, she says, has been a different 
story.  In a 2013 article published as part of the proceedings of the fourth Berle symposium 
Stout argued that because empirical evidence showed shareholder primacy had failed to 
deliver superior returns for the supposed beneficiaries – stockholders – “it (was) time to move 
on to another theory.”114  What will it be?  Stout predicted –“albeit with caution” – that 
“American corporations are likely to respond to the disappointments of shareholder primacy 
by returning to what worked for more than half a century:  some form of managerial 
capitalism.”115  Stout acknowledged that the new corporate philosophy was “unlikely to be 
called managerial capitalism.  But it will bear the hallmarks of managerialism.”116 
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114
  Ibid., 1181.    
115
  Ibid.  See also Chris Gay, Are Shareholders Their Own Worst Enemies?, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REPORT, Sept. 5, 2012 (interview with Stout in which she was asked whether some 
form of managerialism would replace shareholder value and she replied that “The lovely 
thing about the business world is that, given a little breathing room, it's highly adaptable.”) 
116
  Stout, supra note 9, 1182.  Stout elaborates in this article by saying that, consistent 
with what would be expected if the managerialism she had in mind would be akin to that 
which was influential in the 1950s and 1960s, the companies in question would “be owned by 
dispersed passive investors with little or no influence over the firms’ affairs” – ibid.  The two 
examples of “neo-managerialist firms” to which she draws attention, however, do not fit the 
traditional managerialist pattern.  One is firms going public “with multiple share classes that 
allow the firms’ founders and executives to retain voting control” (ibid.).  In firms of this sort 
there will be dominant shareholders whose influence over senior executives will mean that 
management will be unable to exercise the sort of autonomy typically associated with 
managerialism.  The other example Stout provides is private equity firms which have gone 
public, such as Blackstone, Carlyle Group, KKR and Apollo (ibid., 1183).  The founders of 
these firms own dominant stakes, reinforced by the issuance of shares to the public with 
reduced voting rights attached.  Yet again in firms of this sort executives will necessarily lack 
the freedom of action typically associated with managerialism.   
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This means we have from Lynn Stout a prediction for the trajectory of corporate law 
scholarship in addition to the claim that team production theory will become be a key element 
of a new corporate law theory paradigm.  Can Stout’s 2013 prediction of “managerialism 
redux” be reconciled with her assertions concerning the team production model?  Since 
parallels can readily be drawn between team production theory and the managerialist 
conception of the corporation, it might seem so.  In fact, since managerialism appears to leave 
boards little room to perform the mediating function that is integral to team production theory 
any such reconciliation can be at best partial.
117
   
Under team production theory the board is an independent body at the peak of the 
corporate hierarchy that serves as the final arbiter when executives, shareholders, employees 
and other corporate constituencies cannot resolve disputes at lower levels.
118
  This type of 
board is a far more important governance mechanism than the type of board associated with 
managerial capitalism.  As the term “managerialism” implies, with this intellectual model 
senior executives, not directors, occupy centre-stage.  According to Stephen Bainbridge, 
under managerialism “Directors are figureheads, while shareholders are nonentities.  
Managers are thus autonomous actors free to pursue whatever interests they choose.” 119  
With “figurehead” directors, managerialist boards are unlikely candidates to function as the 
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neutral mediating hierarchs the team production model contemplates.  Indeed Dent claims 
that “When managers dominate boards, the team production theory is unworkable.”120 
There can be little doubt that boards of the managerialist corporations of the 1950s 
and 1960s were fundamentally ill-suited to operate in accordance with team production 
theory.  During these decades, nearly half of the individuals serving as directors of public 
companies worked for the same firm in an executive capacity, less than one-quarter were 
genuinely independent and boards were expected to operate as little more than a sounding 
board for the chief executive officer.
121
  Under such circumstances, boards were “largely 
passive instruments of the CEO” and “an extension of management.”122  Hence, during the 
“heyday of…corporate managerialism”123 boards could not realistically perform the role 
assigned to them by team production theory.   
Stout’s recent scholarship does not provide an obvious path for reconciling her 
support for managerialism with her board-centric team production theory.  Stout, in the 2013 
article where she offered conjectures concerning the return of managerialist corporations, did 
not discuss team production theory and cited the 1999 team production article she co-wrote 
with Blair only once so as to make a point concerning corporate law doctrine.
124
  Likewise, in 
The Shareholder Value Myth she offered little explicit guidance on the interrelationship 
between team production theory and a potential re-emergence of managerialism.
125
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Jonathan Macey is in no doubt where Stout stands.  He maintained in a review of The 
Shareholder Value Myth that the key words in the book were “managerial choice” and 
suggested that her “message, slightly obscured, but discernible nevertheless, is that managers 
should run the corporation with plenary authority and with no reference to the shareholders’ 
interests.”126  Whether Stout in fact is, as Macey asserts, a believer in “managerial 
primacy”,127 is open to question given the board-centric nature of team production theory.  
Nevertheless, when Stout discussed directors in conjunction with executives in The 
Shareholder Value Myth, her standard formulation was “directors and executives (or 
managers)”,128 implying in a managerialist fashion that boards and management are on the 
same team.   
If directors and executives are equated in the manner Stout has done in her 2012 book, 
it becomes doubtful whether directors will be able to exercise the independent judgment 
required for them to be the mediating hierarchs team production theory contemplates.  
Perhaps she is simply being realistic.  Various observers have suggested present day boards 
are too much under the sway of senior executives for boards to function in the manner team 
production theory presupposes.
129
  For present purposes, however, the key point is that 
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Stout’s predictions that there will be a (sub-)paradigm shift to team production theory and a 
return to managerial capitalism conflict and cannot be readily reconciled.    
IV. THE INCONVENIENT TRUTH OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM  
Assume, despite the doubts expressed in Part III.B, that with respect to corporate law 
theory one can plausibly characterize the development of corporate law theory in Kuhnian 
terms.  Team production theory’s position nevertheless remains somewhat unclear.  While 
Blair and Stout have suggested it may be part of a new corporate law paradigm, the model 
also can plausibly be characterized as an example of contractarian “normal science” (Part 
III.A).  The team production model also harkens back to the separation of ownership and 
control paradigm in the sense that it might be managerialism revisited (Part III.B).   
While the interrelationship between team production theory and prior corporate law 
theory paradigms is not straightforward, Blair and Stout did unambiguously identify the team 
production model in their 1999 article as a challenger to the notion of shareholder wealth 
maximization.
130
  Could the team production model emerge as a (sub-)paradigm to replace 
shareholder primacy?  In Kuhnian terms this could only occur if inexplicable anomalies 
afflicted the shareholder primacy norm so as to set the stage for a paradigm shift.
131
  As we 
will see now, intellectual challenges to the shareholder value norm accelerated in pace after 
Blair and Stout introduced the team production model.  Conceivably, then, sufficiently 
serious anomalies have emerged for a paradigm shift to occur that would be oriented around 
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team production theory.  A narrative of this sort must confront, however, an “inconvenient 
truth”132 in the form of hedge fund activism.   
Interventions by hedge funds are currently compelling executives in U.S. public 
corporations to treat shareholder value as a higher priority than was the case when Blair and 
Stout unveiled team production theory.  Directors otherwise inclined to act as mediating 
hierarchs in the balanced fashion team production theory contemplates correspondingly might 
well feel compelled to continue to treat shareholders as their top priority.  To the extent this is 
true, hedge fund activism will postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the displacement of shareholder 
primacy required for the ascension of team production theory as a corporate law (sub-
)paradigm.    
A. Shareholder Primacy Anomalies 
In their 1999 article Blair and Stout acknowledged that “shareholder primacy ha(d) 
become increasingly popular” as the 20th century drew to a close.133  Moreover, they said that 
law and economics scholars who were advocates of shareholder wealth maximization and 
“progressive” academics who opposed this normative objective still agreed “that, as a 
descriptive matter, American corporate law follows the shareholder primacy model.”134  A 
core element of Blair and Stout’s critique of shareholder primacy was that this diagnosis of 
corporate law was erroneous.  They argued that corporate law doctrines instead “continue(d) 
to preserve directors’ discretion to act as mediators among all relevant corporate 
constituents.”135  To make their point they analyzed two areas of corporate law where 
shareholders are privileged uniquely as compared to other constituencies affiliated with 
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corporations, namely having standing to enforce breaches of duty by directors by way of a 
derivative suit and having the right to vote on prescribed key issues such as the election of 
directors.
136
   
With derivative suits, Blair and Stout pointed out that even if formally only 
shareholders can launch derivative suits the purpose of such proceedings is to enforce duties 
owed to the corporation rather than duties owed to shareholders and stressed that due to the 
business judgment rule directors have wide discretion available to manage a corporation as 
they see fit.
137
  This led them to argue that, contrary to what shareholder primacy implies, 
“Shareholders in public corporations can sue successfully in the firm’s name only in 
situations where bringing suit benefits not only the shareholders, but the other stakeholders in 
the coalition as well.”138  With shareholder voting rights Blair and Stout conceded in their 
1999 article that rights shareholders had to select directors and vote on certain fundamental 
corporate changes seemed “to grant shareholders a much greater measure of control over how 
the firm is run than other members of the coalition enjoy.”139  Citing the fact that “legal and 
practical obstacles to shareholder action render voting rights almost meaningless” Blair and 
Stout countered by saying that the right to vote on corporate changes was a “fig leaf” and 
“that shareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic sense elect boards.  Rather 
boards elect themselves.”140   
Blair and Stout reviewed corporate law doctrine again in the 2006 article that was part 
of the symposium focusing on Robert Clark’s corporate law treatise, citing various 
“anomalies” to indicate how “corporate law departs from the predictions of the principal-
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agent model”.141  By this point they were by no means alone in casting doubt upon 
shareholder primacy as legal doctrine.  Eric Talley said in 2002 “that much of corporate law 
has already rejected shareholder primacy arguments in favor of allowing managers greater 
freedom of action.”142  In the same symposium issue that Blair and Stout’s 2006 article was a 
part of Jill Fisch observed that “Commentators widely recognize that shareholder primacy 
functions more as a norm than an enforceable legal rule.”143  Martin Gelter suggested in a 
2013 paper that was part of the proceedings of the fourth Berle symposium that U.S. 
corporate law “reflect(ed) the managerialist world.”144  Jonathan Macey said in his review of 
The Shareholder Value Myth that “shareholder primacy…is not law at all…and nobody 
thinks that it is.”145   
The post-1999 challenge to shareholder primacy extended beyond corporate law 
doctrine.  Blair and Stout noted in their 2006 article that “corporate scholars are involved in 
an escalating debate over the best way to understand the modern corporation”146 but the trend 
was by no means restricted to corporate law academics.  An intellectual assault on 
shareholder primacy began in earnest with the drop in share prices occurring when the 
“dot.com” stock market boom ended in 2000.147  Lisa Fairfax said in her 2006 Clark treatise 
symposium paper that “Since 2000, corporate disclosure reflects a shift from the traditional 
                                                          
141
  Blair and Stout, supra note 5, 743. 
142
  Eric Talley, On the Demise of Shareholder Primacy (Or, Murder on the James Trains 
Express), 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2002).   
143
  Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:  The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 650 (2006).   
144
  Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 36 SEATTLE 
UNIV. L. REV. 909, 920 (2013). 
145
  Macey, supra note 126, 911.  
146
  Blair and Stout, supra note 5, 743. 
147
  Justin Fox, How Shareholders Are Ruining American Business, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
July 2013.    
34 
 
shareholder rubric to an embrace of rhetoric focused on stakeholders.”148  To illustrate her 
point, she quoted a 2005 Economist survey on corporate social responsibility that argued this 
movement had “won the battle for ideas”, meaning it was difficult to find a big company that 
would justify its existence purely in terms of profit.
149
  
The financial crisis put the shareholder value norm under further pressure.
150
  A 2009 
editorial in the Financial Times suggested “A palace revolution in the realm of business is 
toppling the dictatorship of shareholder value maximisation as the sole guiding principle for 
corporate action.”151  Indeed, as Stout observed in The Shareholder Value Myth, “Even 
former champions of shareholder primacy (were) beginning to rethink the wisdom of chasing 
shareholder value.”152  She cited the example of Jack Welch, former chief executive of 
General Electric and an early advocate of shareholder value maximization, who said in a 
2009 Financial Times interview “shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world.”153  
Similarly, Michael Jensen, co-author of a foundational article on principal/agent theory,
154
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said “I have never said – and if I have I was being stupid – that a company should be run for 
its stockholders.”155   
Stout’s The Shareholder Value Myth and similar views expressed by other academics 
prompted New York Times columnist Joe Nocera, to say in 2012 that “it feels as if we are at 
the dawn of a new movement – one aimed at overturning the hegemony of shareholder 
value.”156  It might seem, then, that the intellectual ferment qualifies in Kuhnian terms as a 
sufficient accumulation of anomalies to provide the platform for a paradigm (or at least sub-
paradigm) shift away from the shareholder primacy norm in favor of a (sub-)paradigm 
oriented around team production.  It is far from clear, however, that matters have reached this 
stage.  Nocera, for example, substantially hedged his bets, saying of the challenge to 
shareholder primacy “it is hard to know yet whether this new movement will have legs” and 
observing “shareholder value is so deeply entrenched, it will be difficult to dislodge.”157   
The shareholder value norm certainly continues to have its defenders.  For instance, 
even though Macey said in his review of The Shareholder Myth that he believed the 
shareholder primacy norm was an “illusion” in the sense that executives were neither bound 
by law to promote shareholder value nor were genuinely convinced they should act in this 
manner, he maintained shareholder primacy served a valuable governance function as a 
benchmark for identifying self-serving managerial conduct.
158
   There is a more prosaic 
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reason, however, why it is unlikely that the decks will be cleared soon in a way that provides 
the platform for the intellectual dominance of a team production model presupposing boards 
will act as the neutral arbiters and mediating hierarchs.  This is the growing prominence of 
hedge fund activism.     
B. The Prominence of Hedge Fund Activism 
In the 2000s a sub-set of hedge funds -- collective investment vehicles structured to 
operate outside the scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulation of 
investment companies (i.e. mutual funds) -- stepped forward in earnest as activist investors 
targeting underperforming companies.
159
  The typical tactic of an activist hedge fund was to 
build up quietly a sizeable strategic holding in a public company those running the hedge 
fund believed was failing to maximize shareholder returns and then agitate for change to 
correct matters.
160
  Common demands were for targeted companies to return cash to 
shareholders by way of a stock buyback or a one-off dividend payment, to sell weak divisions 
to improve the bottom line or even to put the company itself up for sale.
161
   
By the mid-2000s it was clear hedge fund activism was a potentially significant 
corporate governance phenomenon.
162
  The financial crisis sideswiped activist funds but they 
rallied quickly.
163
  They subsequently went from strength to strength, launching campaigns at 
more than one-fifth of companies in the S&P 500 between 2009 and 2014.
164
  In 2012, the 
Wall Street Journal suggested that the acquisition of a $2 billion stake in Proctor & Gamble 
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Co. by Pershing Square Capital Management, a leading activist hedge fund William Ackman 
runs, reflected “a new era of activist investing” and meant “even America’s largest 
corporations need to keep an eye out for investors who might push for board seats and big 
shifts in strategy.”165  The Financial Times said 2013 marked “the triumph of activism” and 
Barron’s observed the same year that “(a)ctivist investing ha(d) entered a new golden age.”166  
In 2014, the New York Times said of Daniel Loeb’s Third Point LLC, another major activist 
hedge fund, and its brethren, “They have amassed huge war chests to take on some of the 
biggest names in corporate America – and win more often than not.”167   
The success activist hedge funds have had obtaining representation on boards 
illustrates their growing influence.  While when Blair and Stout wrote their 1999 article on 
team production boards may well have in effect elected themselves,
168
 hedge funds can now 
have a substantial say when they target companies.  According to FactSet Research 60% of 
proxy fights prompted by a hedge fund activist that went to an actual vote in 2013 resulted in 
at least a partial activist victory, the highest win rate in the thirteen years the firm had been 
tracking the data.
169
  Though hedge fund activists only obtained directorships at 18 U.S. 
public companies in 2013 when a vote occurred, on 72 additional occasions they secured 
board seats in settlements reached after launching a proxy contest.
170
  Moreover, in a 
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departure from past practice public companies have begun offering, as a means of forestalling 
prolonged confrontation, boardroom representation to activists who have not even launched 
proxy contests for board seats.
171
  Carl Icahn, a veteran shareholder activist, remarked in 
2013 he was “surprised” how readily board seats were being offered without a proxy fight.172   
The success of hedge fund activists has in turn influenced the boardroom agenda.  The 
Financial Times indicated in 2013 that activists were finding “more directors receptive to the 
traditional activist ideas of returning capital, spinning off businesses and even inviting 
activists’ representatives on to the board.”173  Similarly according to Barron’s “companies 
under scrutiny see little choice but to unbolt their boardroom doors.”174  Companies, 
moreover, are not waiting until they have been targeted to introduce changes hedge funds 
would view favorably.  In 2013 the New York Times quoted the head of contested situations 
at a major investment bank as saying “Your defense today before an activist shows up is all 
about blocking and tackling, dynamic self-assessment, followed by really enhanced investor 
outreach.”175  In other words, those running public companies “look at (their) company 
through the lens of an activist.”176  Moody’s, the bond-rating agency, identified a potential 
by-product in a 2014 report to clients, suggesting that bondholders could face “a rising tide of 
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credit negative events” as managers apprehensive about hedge fund activism took action to 
distribute cash to shareholders that jeopardized cost-saving initiatives.
177
   
Activist hedge funds are not having matters entirely their own way with public 
companies.  Instead, a growing number of boards are changing corporate by-laws to 
introduce a new generation of poison pills – mechanisms designed to preclude an unwanted 
shareholder from acquiring a stake above a prescribed level -- that kick into operation at 
considerably lower thresholds (typically around 10%) to bolster leverage in dealings with 
activist investors.
178
  Implicitly confirming Blair and Stout’s observation that courts afford 
boards wide discretion to run corporations in the manner directors see fit the Delaware Court 
of Chancery upheld in a 2014 case the validity of a poison pill of auction house Sotheby’s 
that impinged upon Daniel Loeb’s Third Point.179   
Though the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling would have been a disappointment 
to hedge fund activists, it seems unlikely to mean the end of “the new era of activist 
investing.”  In Sotheby’s dispute with Third Point, despite Sotheby’s courtroom victory, 
Sotheby’s agreed to endorse Third Point’s three nominees as directors, partly due to backing 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an influential shareholder advisory firm, was 
providing for Third Point.
180
  So long as activist hedge funds can secure support from key 
players such as ISS they will continue to have considerable clout in the boardroom.  For 
instance, due to opposition from ISS in 2014 most of 33 public companies that had adopted 
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by-laws precluding directors nominated by activist shareholders from taking payment from 
the activist reversed course.
181
  The upshot is that even if shareholder primacy has suffered 
setbacks in the battle of ideas over the past few years, to the extent that directors might be 
inclined to act as mediating hierarchs rather than focus on shareholder value, hedge fund 
activism’s “triumph” means they will pause.  That is potentially an inconvenient truth for 
team production theory.    
C. Blair, Stout and Hedge Fund Activism 
Blair and Stout did not refer to hedge funds or shareholder activists in the 1999 article 
where they introduced the team production model.
182
  This is hardly surprising.  While some 
hedge fund activism did occur in the 1990s, it was not at that point a significant corporate 
governance phenomenon.
183
   
Blair and Stout did briefly acknowledge in their 1999 article the growth in 
prominence of mainstream institutional shareholders -- mutual funds and pension funds -- 
saying that a 1980s move to the forefront by institutional investors might explain why boards, 
as mediating hierarchs, had been directing to shareholders an increasing proportion of the 
surplus corporate team production generated.
184
  Substantial growth in institutional ownership 
as a percentage of publicly traded shares may indeed help to explain why shareholder 
primacy achieved prominence as the 20
th
 century drew to a close.
185
  Still, while the rise of 
institutional shareholders prompted predictions in the early 1990s that meaningful 
shareholder control of public companies could be on the cards such expectations were largely 
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unfulfilled.
186
  For instance, John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard mutual fund group, 
remarked in 2007 upon “the virtual absence of mutual funds and private pension funds from 
actual participation in corporate governance.”187  Correspondingly, it is understandable that 
when Blair and Stout initially presented their team production model they did not treat 
shareholder activism as a major stumbling block for directors seeking to operate as mediating 
hierarchs rather than merely as agents for shareholders.   
What have Blair and Stout had to say about the subsequent surge in hedge fund 
activism?  To this point Margaret Blair has only referred to hedge funds very briefly in her 
writing and has not sought to address in any detail the implications of the “golden age” of 
hedge fund activism for the team production model or corporate law theory more 
generally.
188
  Lynn Stout has been more forthcoming.  She has acknowledged, for instance, 
that the influence of hedge funds and shareholders more generally has been growing.  In a 
2008 article she and Iman Anabtawi co-wrote they said that “because of activist hedge funds, 
‘the balance of power is shifting away from boards.’”189  Moreover, in a 2013 article in which 
Stout agreed with Ed Rock that U.S. corporate governance was a “shareholder-centric” 
system she acknowledged the “increasing clout” of hedge funds together with mainstream 
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investors and indicated that “shifts in corporate law and practice over the past two decades” 
had “largely solved” the problem of “wayward managers exploiting helpless shareholders.”190   
There is a potential clash between what Stout has said about shareholder activism 
trends and her prediction concerning team production model’s emergence as a new corporate 
law paradigm.  It is difficult to see how directors can act effectively as mediating hierarchs in 
the way team production theory requires in a milieu where hedge funds are fostering a shift of 
power in favor of shareholders in what has already, according to Stout, evolved into a 
shareholder-centric corporate governance system.  Correspondingly, even if the shareholder 
primacy norm has been subjected to intellectual criticism, it hardly seems the decks are clear, 
or are likely to be soon, for the arrival of new corporate law (sub-)paradigm in which team 
production theory will be an integral element.   
The inconvenient truth hedge fund activism poses for the team production model does 
not mean Stout is waving any white flags.  Instead, in her symposium contribution for the 
fourth Berle symposium she said shareholder primacy had been “largely falsified” and 
asserted “it is time to move on to another theory”, heralding in so doing “some form of 
managerial capitalism” as a contender.191  Why might a shareholder-centric system bolstered 
by hedge fund activism be on the ropes in the manner Stout implies?  She went on to say in 
her contribution to the fourth Berle symposium that shareholder primacy was like 
Communism, in that both were theories that were “embraced for a period of time” but were 
“not firmly grounded in the realities of the world” and thus were “doomed to fail”.192   
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In what sense has shareholder primacy not been “firmly grounded”?  Stout suggested 
that while shareholder primacy might be “elegant and intellectually appealing” it had failed to 
deliver beneficial results, not only for corporate constituencies other than shareholders but for 
shareholders themselves.
193
  How can it be that shareholder primacy has worked out badly for 
shareholders?  Here hedge fund activists, characterized by Stout as investors who are 
“notorious” for owning shares for short periods,194 have been tagged as culprits.  According 
to Stout, “the new shareholder-centric reality causes managers to think, in particular, like 
short-term shareholders”,195 thereby prompting counterproductively myopic business 
decisions that erode shareholder returns over the long haul.
196
  
Stout, in The Shareholder Value Myth, elaborated upon how the agenda of hedge fund 
activists differ from that of other shareholders.  She contrasted “universal” owners (retail and 
institutional investors with stakes in the economy and the community other than shares in 
public companies), with hedge funds, which she said exercised disproportionate and 
counterproductive influence by “taking relatively large positions in relatively few 
companies…(to) position themselves with realistic threats of embarrassing news stories and 
proxy battles….”197  According to Stout, the interests of hedge fund activists and universal 
owners “often clash” as hedge funds pressure companies to make changes that bolster 
shareholder returns in the few companies in which they own stock while the interests of 
diversified universal owners are prejudiced because the changes prompt the value of bonds 
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and other shares the universal owners hold to decline and cause employee benefits such as 
pensions to be cut.
198
   
The dynamics of share ownership in publicly traded companies cast doubt on Stout’s 
argument that the interests of hedge fund activists and mainstream institutional shareholders – 
key examples of her “universal owners” – are destined to clash.  If disagreements between 
hedge fund activists and mainstream institutional investors were fundamental and 
commonplace, hedge fund activism would be a much less prevalent and influential strategy 
than it is currently.  Hedge fund activists acquire, on average, ownership stakes of 8% in the 
public companies they target.
199
   Under such circumstances hedge fund activists will only 
have significant leverage over the directors of the companies they target if they can persuade 
a substantial proportion of other shareholders to support the initiatives they propose.
200
  As 
William Ackman, the prominent hedge fund activist, has said:  
“The vast majority of capital in the world is passive.  These investors control the 
votes.  If they think an activist is wrong, they won’t support him.  But at least they 
have a choice.”201 
Given the choice shareholders have concerning hedge fund activist initiatives, as Ronald 
Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon have observed, with U.S. public companies “both activist and 
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institutional shareholders must agree for a proposal to go forward.”202  Due to this “happy 
complementarity”203 a direct clash of interests between hedge fund activists and other 
shareholders should be the exception to the rule.
204
   
Mainstream institutional shareholders began offering backing for hedge fund activists 
with regularity in the early 2000s, which set the stage for hedge funds to move to emerge as 
meaningful governance players.
205
  The “happy complementarity” between hedge fund 
activists and institutional shareholders seems to be growing in strength, which in turn has 
helped to foster the post-financial crisis surge in activism.
206
  In 2013 Mary Jo White, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission chairman, indicated that while “the ‘activist’ moniker 
had a distinctly negative connotation” there was now “widespread acceptance of many of the 
policy changes that so-called ‘activists’ are seeking to effect.”207  Indeed, U.S. pension funds 
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have begun investing directly in activist hedge funds and activist Carl Icahn has said that 
some mainstream institutional investors “even egg us on.”208  Given such observations it not 
only is doubtful that the priorities of hedge fund activists and other shareholders diverge in 
the manner Stout has suggested but also that directors will be in a position any time soon 
where they can treat shareholders as just another corporate constituency to take into account 
in the boardroom.  It correspondingly seems unlikely team production theory will displace 
shareholder primacy as a corporate governance paradigm (or sub-paradigm) in the 
foreseeable future.   
V. CONCLUSION  
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, in their path-breaking 1999 article “A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law” neither cited Thomas Kuhn nor referred to their team 
production model as a potential new corporate law paradigm.
209
  This is not surprising, given 
that they situated the model as an elaboration upon the then dominant mode of corporate law 
thinking, the nexus of contracts model.  Correspondingly, it might seem that this paper, by 
evaluating the team production model by reference to Kuhn and his notions of scientific 
revolutions and paradigm shifts, engages in inappropriate benchmarking.  Blair and Stout, 
however, did invoke Kuhn explicitly in a 2006 article on anomalies – another Kuhnian term – 
affecting corporate law theory when arguing team production theory could be part of a new 
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corporate law paradigm.
210
  Correspondingly, for the purposes of this symposium on the team 
production model Kuhn and his work do provide an appropriate reference point for analyzing 
Blair and Stout’s model.   
This paper has shown that on various levels situating team production theory as a new 
corporate law paradigm is problematic.  It is unclear whether Kuhnian concepts can be 
deployed appropriately with corporate law theory, given that the scientific method of enquiry 
of interest to Kuhn has not been routinely invoked by corporate law scholars and given that 
the intellectual consensus required for Kuhn’s “normal science” to occur may have never 
been present in the corporate law realm.  Even if corporate law scholarship trends are 
reducible to Kuhnian terms team production theory’s status as a new paradigm is 
questionable.  Not only did Blair and Stout fail to challenge directly in their path-breaking 
1999 article the dominant contractarian paradigm but their characterization of boards under 
team production resembles in various ways managerialist thinking associated with the 
separation of ownership and control paradigm that preceded the intellectual dominance of the 
nexus of contracts model.   
It is true that Blair and Stout did challenge directly in their 1999 article a shareholder 
primacy norm often linked with the nexus of contracts model that could perhaps be 
characterized as a sub-paradigm of corporate law scholarship.  In so doing, they made various 
telling points concerning corporate law doctrine.  Nevertheless, subsequent events indicate 
that shareholder primacy may well be resilient in the corporate governance realm despite a 
strong intellectual challenge Blair and Stout and others posed.  In particular, a surge in hedge 
fund activism surge occurring over the past decade has meant that directors of public 
corporations have had to treat shareholders as a priority in a way that team production theory 
does not countenance.      
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While this paper has shown team production theory is unlikely to achieve 
paradigmatic status within the realm of corporate law theory, this does not detract materially 
from the contribution that Blair and Stout’s 1999 article has made to corporate law 
scholarship.  Academic work that qualifies as the foundation for a new paradigm is 
exceedingly rare, even assuming that an intellectual discipline is suited for analysis in 
Kuhnian terms.  Team production theory seems unlikely to become part of such rarefied 
company.  Nevertheless, Blair and Stout’s 1999 article has been widely read and cited and 
has prompted considerable debate among legal academics and more broadly, with this 6
th
 
Berle symposium being merely the most recent evidence of the article’s substantial impact.  
Invoking Kuhn one last time, not bad for normal science!    
